St. Louis Cardinals: Don’t believe in Santa Closer
A belief in having a designated 9th inning closer is costing teams. The St. Louis Cardinals have now been bitten by this belief, big-time.
High leverage pitching situations can happen anywhere, in any inning of the game. They should be serviced by the best available live arm. The best available live arm should be evaluated based on a host of factors. The St. Louis Cardinals bullpen is no exception
Charts and matchups, yes. But pennant-race and play-off situations are “all hands on deck” and so the evaluation should include a quick determination of whose arm looks live in bullpen warm-ups. “Who seems most ready, mentally and physically?” That is the question.
It should also involve a quick-hook by the manager if a pitcher seems to be going south in live-action.
Contrast this rational approach with the childlike belief in a set closer who will save a team in the ninth inning.
In this Cult of the Closer, he is even credited with getting out of his own jams. Giving up only three runs with a four-run lead is accounted as being “part of his plan.” The Cardinals have had many closers in this decade who, on paper, still look great to this day, having converted a high percentage of “save opportunities.”
But how many of those opportunities were high-leverage? Probably very few.
And what percentage of that percentage is based on the pitcher’s win-probability added and how much is based on the law of averages? In most cases, even with an average pitcher, an opposing team will not score sufficient runs in the ninth inning to take the lead. And the opposing team’s chances will die a death more from natural causes than the skill of the reliever.
A closer who gives up fewer runs than the lead he inherited is given a pat on the back and is said to be someone who “gets the job done one way or another.” Notice that this is never said about a middle-inning reliever. He, by contrast, is said to have “blown a healthy lead.”
There is even a two-letter designation for a closer in Baseball Reference (“CL”) as if that were a separate position like RF or SS. This cult of the closer must stop. Of course, this will make it much harder on managers.
Under the current system, a manager is supposed to above all else, “show faith in his closer.” This makes the manager a”good Joe” and supposedly a better handler of “human beings.” Meanwhile, the team goes down the drain.
And of course, the agents love him because the manager is giving the relief pitcher a concrete stat they can point to in order to argue that a high percentage of the team’s fortunes were caused by the agent’s client.
This system has got to stop.
Another upside to having no designated closer is there is no one to depose as closer. Manager Mike Shildt will be deciding, either now or during Spring Training, whether to supplant Carlos Martinez with someone else. This will no doubt be bad for Martinez’ – or anybody’s – ego, just as it was for the litany of the past decades’ designated closers.
Instead, teams should tell their bullpen guys to be ready for any situation, that there is no one who “owns” the ninth inning. This would be not just better for morale, but for aggregate bullpen performance.
About last night.
The key for Cardinals’ manager Shildt in game three of the NLDS versus the Atlanta Braves was to determine whether Martinez had his stuff or not.
Mainly you want to know about whether he has his location or not. Not hitting your spots throws off whatever strategy you have laid, plus causes walks. Obviously giving up a leadoff double on an 88 mph change-up down the middle of the plate on the second pitch is not a good sign.
More concerning though are the next two batters Martinez faced, which both resulted in outs.
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You are playing in one of the more spacious ballparks. Fly balls have been dying in the deep outfield all night long. You should know that the number-one commandment is not to walk the winning run on base. You should be throwing strikes. But there were tell-tale signs that Martinez did not have his location.
Before Darby Swanson came to the plate, there were nine consecutive pitches that were not wholly in the zone. Some of them could have been deliberate. But all nine? Some were way outside and a challenge for Molina to catch. They could not have been intentional from Martinez. “How does a person throw a pitch like that and then suddenly regain pinpoint control?” I thought.
The fact that Nick Markakis and Adeiny Hechavarria struck out on pitches way out of the zone, or that Martinez received some good borderline calls, does not change the fact that you have not hit the strike zone solidly in nine pitches. You want your high-leverage pitcher to throw strikes with good stuff.
Between the solid Josh Donaldson double, and the way that the counts went with Markakais and Hechevarria, it should have been clear that Martinez did not have his stuff. Especially when you factor in some recent rough outings for Martinez. Giovanny Gallegos would have been a better choice to face the hot Swanson.
But then the blind faith in The Closer Who Will Save Us kicked in.
The faith was so blind that Shildt did not even have a pitcher warmed up and Martinez had to suffer through the rest of the inning even after it was clear to everyone in the ballpark that Martinez did not have it. Which was brutal to watch and dispiriting to fans no doubt.
Closers can – and do – perform good work. But limiting one pitcher and one pitcher alone to that role is seldom a good idea.