Is Oliver Marmol improving as a manager for the St. Louis Cardinals?

Team pitching under Marmol

While Team ERA (0.388 this year vs. 0.404 last year) primarily reflects pitcher performance, other metrics can assess a manager’s impact on pitching.

Inherited Runners: (Number of runners on base when pitcher entered the game) Last year they ranked 16th. This year 13th. 

Games Entered With Bases Empty: (Pitcher entered the game with no runners on base) Last year the team was 4th. This year, 2nd. 

IPmult: (Games the pitcher pitched in more than one inning) Last year the Cardinals had the 6th most innings. This year 18th most. 

LevHi: (games pitcher entered in a high-leverage situation) this year, 8th most. Last year was 6th most. 

Marmol’s management of the pitching staff presents a mixed picture. He continues to deploy pitchers in high-leverage situations more frequently than most managers, which is not good, but appears to be asking them to pitch fewer multi-inning outings. None of these numbers show a clear improvement.

Defense

A manager can significantly influence team defense by prioritizing it, which appears to be the case with the Cardinals. The team’s defense ranks high in Outs Above Average and defensive runs saved. However, when examining pitchers’ BABIP (Batting Average on Balls In Play), the team is exactly average. Additionally, Baseball Reference’s Defensive Efficiency statistic places them 15th, just barely above average. While the players are typically effective at making outs when they get to the ball, an underlying issue may be with pitchers who are not “swing and miss” types, leading to more balls finding more holes in the defense.

Summary

Grading a manager is inherently complex. We lack insight into their relationships with players, and this year, Marmol faces a challenging directive: Develop young players while also securing a playoff berth. Therefore, I haven’t attempted to assess his overall team management.

Instead, I’ve focused on game management, comparing his in-game decisions to those of other managers and to his own performance last year. I’ve specifically used statistics that are not dependent on individual player performance. For example, if a pinch-hitter makes an out, that’s not the manager’s fault; the concern arises if he fails to utilize a pinch-hitter when appropriate.

Based on these metrics, particularly on the offensive side, there’s little discernible improvement from last year. Marmol’s calls for bunts, stolen bases, and pinch-hitting are actually worse. On the pitching side, he still seems to wait too long to bring in relievers, contributing to the Cardinals’ high ranking in high-leverage situations.

These statistics suggest a lack of aggression and creativity in game management. Fans often expect more, recalling the 1985 Cardinals, a team not built on home runs, yet employing “Whiteyball” tactics to accumulate 314 stolen bases (with the next closest team having 182). Similarly, Tony La Russa famously experimented with batting the pitcher eighth or moving a pitcher to the outfield for a single batter to gain even the slightest advantage.

While the team’s overall performance this year is better than predicted, the manager’s in-game strategy, when viewed through these specific metrics, does not show any noticeable improvement.