Cardinals: Paul DeJong – The Downfall We Should Have Seen Coming

Paul DeJong’s decline began in his All-Star 2019 season, and we all were too naïve to see it coming.

When taking a deep dive into Cardinals shortstop Paul DeJong’s rollercoaster ride at the plate the past few seasons, the proof was not in the results but at the inconsistencies of how his swing operates. Undoubtedly, DeJong’s 2018 and 2019 seasons with the club were his best. In 2018 he slashed .241/.313/.433 in 490 plate appearances and in his All-Star campaign in 2019 he slashed .233/.318/.444 in 664 trips to the dish.

Prior to those two breakout seasons, DeJong signed his pre-arbitration agreement for 6 years and 26 million with the majority of the guaranteed money coming in 2023 this upcoming season of $9 million. As discussed in another article discussed by Josh Jacobs, John Mozeliak is leaving the door open for DeJong after a horrible campaign a year ago, but also made it clear “Do you want someone that’s a defensive is replacement at 9 million a year? No that’s not ideal.” His defense has been a staple to what the Cardinals offer on a nightly basis on the field. His value there allows him so flexibility at home plate when he has his struggles, but what we saw the previous two full seasons being 2021 and 2022 his issues at the plate began to overshadow his help in the field.

So, what happened with his swing? His issues began in his All-Star 2019 season. There were clear signs that is swing was changing, inconsistent, and lacking a proper identity that he could replicate. Here is what we missed.

1. Paul DeJong’s contact rate dropped in 2019.

Paul DeJong’s bat to ball contact shifted in 2019 from 2018. Which in hindsight, should have brought the concern of consistency to the forefront with team personnel with his swing. In 2018, his ground ball percentage was at 32.1% and line drive percentage was at 28.3%. In 2019, his ground ball rate spiked to 37.7% and line drive rate dipped to 22%. Thus, meaning he was not driving the ball the same way even though his results improved in regular statistics if you consider his slash line.

Compounding the issue and maybe highlighting the cause, he began to get pull happy trying to drive more homeruns seeing as he was seen as a middle of the order regular. His contact issue became overlooked as he popped 30 homeruns in 2019.

His groundball rollovers came at a cost, too. Checking his hitter spray results (pull/center/oppo) in 2018 he was 42.5%/30.2%/27.4% and in 2019 he was 45.2%/35.2%/19.5%.  The change reviewed here shows that in 2019, over 80% of his swings resulted in up the middle and pull which was an 8% increase in 1 season. The cost of trying to hit homeruns were the ground ball double plays he rolled into which jumped to 15. Inning killers.

2. Paul DeJong’s strikeout rate skyrocketed.

In his latest campaign in 2022 it was evident that Pauly-D was just not making contact enough. Strikeouts, although present more than ever in today’s game, became the final straw for him. Here you can see how the contact type he was trying to provide also created more swing and miss with his Strikeout percent:

2018- 25.1%

2019- 22.4%

2020- 28.7%

2021- 25.6%

2022- 33.3%

Compounding his all or nothing swing and misses, he also was failing to reach base more as his walk rate declined from a peak in 2020 of 9.8% down to most recently this past 2022 season at 8.9%.

3. Paul DeJong’s Launch Angle never regained form.

It was evident that in Spring Training 2022 his focus was to use more of the field. As shown on previous slides, that was a great focus for him to be alert and conscious about moving forward and possibly could have righted the ship. However, his swing plane never rebounded to his All-Star level seasons in connection with his new thought process of being less pull happy.

Let’s start with his launch angle in his two good campaigns in 2018 and 2019. They remained fairly consistent those two years: 19.1 and 18.3 respectfully. From 2020-2022 he never regained the form of the swing plane that previously produced results. His launch angle rose to 21.7% in the shortened season of 2020, decreased to career low 16.4% in 2021, and spiked back to 21.7% in 2022. Although he did produce a cleaner spray chart 45.1%/24.8%/30.1% in 2022, which was a career high in opposite field bat to ball contact, his swing plane failed him. He hit too many balls in the air with a high launch angle.

As a result, his fly ball percentage was 6.6% higher in 2022 than 2019. This new bat path also may have been a culprit of his strikeout rate as his whiff percentage followed suit increasing to 35.2% of swings compared to 24.2% in 2019 and 25.4% in 2018.