Is Oliver Marmol improving as a manager for the St. Louis Cardinals?

As the baseball season progresses, we gain a clearer picture of each team’s performance, with some already engaging in minor trades. Our own Scott Plaza has even compiled a list of potential Cardinals trade chips. At this point, we can assess individual player progression, backed by a wealth of statistics. For example, Victor Scott II’s improvement is noticeable, while Nolan Gorman’s struggles are equally apparent. The underlying reasons for these shifts, however, are less clear. Is it purely player performance, or is the coaching and managerial staff failing to optimize their positioning for success?

While the argument “the manager doesn’t hit” holds some truth, a manager’s influence extends significantly beyond that. They determine when a player swings (or doesn’t, via signs), when to pinch-hit, and when to call for a stolen base. They don’t pitch, but they decide when a pitcher has thrown one too many pitches. Therefore, evaluating a manager’s performance requires a different lens.

Over the past few years, I’ve identified several key metrics that fall directly under a manager’s responsibility. To ensure fairness, I’ve focused on criteria that allow for meaningful comparison. For instance, comparing the stolen bases of a “Whiteyball” era team to the current team wouldn’t be reasonable due to different contexts. However, comparing this year’s Cardinals to the other 31 MLB teams is. I’ve excluded stats like home runs, as a manager cannot directly call for them, but included actions they control, such as calling for a bunt, deciding when to change pitchers, or authorizing a stolen base. I will refrain from critiquing specific player choices for pitching changes or pinch-hitting, as we lack insight into potential undisclosed issues affecting those players.

From a macro perspective, the Cardinals’ record on June 1st this year stands at 33 wins and 26 losses, an improvement over last year’s 27-29. However, much like pitcher wins, this statistic can be misleading.

Let's take a look at how the Cardinals are playing in all three phases of under Oliver Marmol's leadership

Team offense under Marmol

A manager has limited control over batting average, OBP, or other fundamental hitting statistics; these are primarily the responsibility of the players and hitting coaches. However, once a player reaches first base, the manager’s role in guiding them home becomes paramount.

XBT% — Extra Bases Taken Percentage - In other words, do they stop the runners at first, turning doubles into singles and triples into doubles? You could blame this on the coaches, but the manager is the one that ultimately determines the aggressiveness of the team. League average is 42%. This year they are 43%. Last year they were 44%. 

Not much better or worse but still average

Stolen Bases: More teams are generating runs by stealing. The rule changes a couple of years ago made it much easier. Few teams have anyone who is given an automatic green light. Most of the time, steals are called. This year they rank 25th with 35 steals. League average is 47. Last year they ranked 22nd. 

Worse than last year and still way below league average

Bunts: How is this manager with moving the runner over? This year the Cardinals rank 17th in bunts with 17 bunts. Last year they were 12th in bunts. League average is 15 bunts. 

Worse than last year and barely above league average

1stS3: (On First, when a single is hit, and the runner reaches third or scores) The age-old first to third. One of the prettiest plays in baseball. Last year they ranked 9th. This year 5th. I’m sure you think that this is because Victor Scott is on the team. You would be wrong. He has the fastest speed on the team, but Brendan Donovan has more. 

Better than last year and ranking in the top five. 

Pinch Hitting: Last year, they ranked 26th for the number of pinch hits. This year they rank 28th with 26. League average is 39. 

 Worse than last year and way below average

Pinch Hit Leverage Index: The index measures the importance of the context in which a pinch hitter was used; a value above one indicates above-average pressure. This year it they are again the second highest team to bring in pinch hitters in high-leverage spots. So the Cardinals bring in few pinch hitters and for the most part only bring them in at high leverage spots.

No improvement and still way above league average

Team pitching under Marmol

While Team ERA (0.388 this year vs. 0.404 last year) primarily reflects pitcher performance, other metrics can assess a manager’s impact on pitching.

Inherited Runners: (Number of runners on base when pitcher entered the game) Last year they ranked 16th. This year 13th. 

Games Entered With Bases Empty: (Pitcher entered the game with no runners on base) Last year the team was 4th. This year, 2nd. 

IPmult: (Games the pitcher pitched in more than one inning) Last year the Cardinals had the 6th most innings. This year 18th most. 

LevHi: (games pitcher entered in a high-leverage situation) this year, 8th most. Last year was 6th most. 

Marmol’s management of the pitching staff presents a mixed picture. He continues to deploy pitchers in high-leverage situations more frequently than most managers, which is not good, but appears to be asking them to pitch fewer multi-inning outings. None of these numbers show a clear improvement.

Defense

A manager can significantly influence team defense by prioritizing it, which appears to be the case with the Cardinals. The team’s defense ranks high in Outs Above Average and defensive runs saved. However, when examining pitchers’ BABIP (Batting Average on Balls In Play), the team is exactly average. Additionally, Baseball Reference’s Defensive Efficiency statistic places them 15th, just barely above average. While the players are typically effective at making outs when they get to the ball, an underlying issue may be with pitchers who are not “swing and miss” types, leading to more balls finding more holes in the defense.

Summary

Grading a manager is inherently complex. We lack insight into their relationships with players, and this year, Marmol faces a challenging directive: Develop young players while also securing a playoff berth. Therefore, I haven’t attempted to assess his overall team management.

Instead, I’ve focused on game management, comparing his in-game decisions to those of other managers and to his own performance last year. I’ve specifically used statistics that are not dependent on individual player performance. For example, if a pinch-hitter makes an out, that’s not the manager’s fault; the concern arises if he fails to utilize a pinch-hitter when appropriate.

Based on these metrics, particularly on the offensive side, there’s little discernible improvement from last year. Marmol’s calls for bunts, stolen bases, and pinch-hitting are actually worse. On the pitching side, he still seems to wait too long to bring in relievers, contributing to the Cardinals’ high ranking in high-leverage situations.

These statistics suggest a lack of aggression and creativity in game management. Fans often expect more, recalling the 1985 Cardinals, a team not built on home runs, yet employing “Whiteyball” tactics to accumulate 314 stolen bases (with the next closest team having 182). Similarly, Tony La Russa famously experimented with batting the pitcher eighth or moving a pitcher to the outfield for a single batter to gain even the slightest advantage.

While the team’s overall performance this year is better than predicted, the manager’s in-game strategy, when viewed through these specific metrics, does not show any noticeable improvement.